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SCIENCE AND "POST-DISCRIMINATORY'' 
WTOLAW 
RoBERT E. HunEc* 
It seems to me that the word "kickoff' would describe my remarks 
today better than "keynote." The word "keynote" makes its sound as if 
I am confident of what I am doing and that I will be guiding all of 
you. By contrast, "kickoff," as you know, is an exertion of energy to-
ward a football without very much idea exactly where it is going to 
land. That, I think, is a somewhat more appropriate description of my 
remarks today. 
The prospectus for this conference asked us to focus on provi-
sions of international trade law that call for decisions about the sci-
entific validity or the scientific justification for certain regulatory provi-
sions. The most visible of such provisions is, of course, the [World 
Trade Organization] [ (WTO)] Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary [SPS] Measures adopted in 1994 in the 
Uruguay Round, in which governments undertake an obligation to 
ensure that [SPS] measures must be based on scientific principles, 
and in certain cases, must be based on a proper risk assessment. An-
other agreement which seems to call for a similar kind of scientific 
investigation is the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the so-
called Standards Code. In addition to those two, I would like to call 
attention to the fact that issues of scientific validity are sometimes cen-
tral to the application of [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] 
[(GATT)] Article XX, an exemption provision for public policy 
measures, which states that if a measure is necessitated by some rea-
son such as health or safety, it may be permitted even though its terms 
it would violate the agreement. And finally, under some formulations 
of GATT non-discrimination provisions, the character of a measure as 
discriminatory or non-discriminatory depends upon the question of 
whether its enactment can be justified by some valid non-trade pur-
pose. It should be apparent that a measure's legality by reference to 
that test often depends on the scientific validity of the claim of non-
trade purpose. 
* This text is a verbatim transcript of Professor Hudec's remarks, edited for publica-
tion by David A. Wirth. 
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Dean Garvey, in his introductory remarks, [reproduced in the 
present volume] anticipated a good deal of what I was going to say. 
One aspect of constitutional law in the United States, the so-called 
Dormant Commerce Clause, is very similar to what one sees in the 
GATT and WTO with regard to the interplay between the concept of 
discrimination and the scientific justification for regulatory measures 
that are being attacked. This is a central question about science-based 
legal criteria. Stated broadly, the issue is whether, and to what extent, 
science is actually capable of answering the questions posed by such 
provisions. Participants in this conference are asked to discuss the na-
ture of the scientific issues that are likely to be confronted in the ap-
plication of those trade law provisions from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives and the relationship between those provisions, and of 
scientific analysis, to the policy goals which those provisions address. 
The goal is a better understanding of how such science-based provi-
sions are likely to operate in practice and, ultimately, an understand-
ing of the impact that such provisions are likely to have in the field of 
national regulations. 
My role today is to provide some context for these questions and 
to point out some more particular questions that might usefully be 
addressed. My contribution will have nothing to do with the nature of 
science or scientific inquiry, a subject on which I am not qualified to 
speak, but rather will be framed from the perspective of a legal 
scholar familiar with the different types of trade law provisions at issue 
here and familiar with the adjudication process by which they are ap-
plied. Having served as a member of several GATT, WTO, and [North 
American Free Trade Agreement] [ (NAFTA)] adjudicatory panels, I 
can perhaps offer some particular observations from the perspective 
of one who has actually had occasion to render legal judgments apply-
ing some of these provisions in practice. 
One of the most useful things I might attempt to do is to clarifY 
the various purposes of the legal provisions that are causing concern 
in this area. On the basis of that further explanation, I hope to be 
able to make some suggestions that will add greater precision to the 
questions asked in this conference and, accordingly, to the conclu-
sions reached. I am sure that many of you will know a good deal more 
about what I am going to say, but I believe it can be quite useful from 
time to time to rearrange what one already knows about a subject. 
The central theme of my remarks is that the approach one takes 
to the use of science in science-based legal criteria will often depend, 
consciously or not, on the assumptions that one makes about the pur-
poses of these legal criteria. I think it would be useful if, at a mini-
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mum, authors criticizing the science-based criteria in the various 
trade law provisions they are addressing were to ask themselves about 
the assumptions they have, the assumptions they make about the pur-
poses of the prO\isions they are talking about. It would be even more 
helpful if they were actually to articulate the assumptions they make 
about the purposes of these provisions. Even the members of the 
trade policy community sometimes have difficulty in identifying the 
purposes ofWfO rules. 
Traditionally, trade agreements have focused on limiting or 
eliminating discrimination against foreign trade by disciplining gov-
ernmental measures that impose competitive disadvantages on for-
eign goods vis-a-vis domestic goods with which they compete. In the 
recent Uruguay Round trade agreements, however, it appears that the 
draftsmen of two key agreements added another goal, one that can be 
described as the prevention of unjustified regulation per se, whether or 
not such a regulation creates a competitive disadvantage for foreign 
goods vis-a-vis domestic goods. Thus, for example, a food safety meas-
ure that is not based on scientific principles would be a violation of 
Article 2 of the Agreement on the Application of [SPS] Measures, 
whether or not it discriminates against foreign goods. While other 
rules of the SPS Agreement are directed at traditional trade agree-
ment concerns about discrimination, it is clear that violations of pro-
\isions like Article 2 do not require findings of discrimination. 
Another example is the Appellate Body decision in the hormones 
case, which finds a violation of Article 5.1 of the SPS agreement on 
the basis of the European Community's failure to base its hormone 
restrictions on a proper risk assessment. The Appellate Body in that 
case expressly rejected the panel's finding that the measure was dis-
criminatory. In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Body said that 
the absence of a risk assessment is a violation of the agreement even 
though there is, it found, no trade discrimination. I am told by those 
who negotiated the Uruguay Round Standards Code that the same is 
true of the key obligation, Paragraph 2.2 of that agreement. It pro-
vides for the prohibition of product standards that could create "an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade." Although, to my knowl-
edge, there have been no wro decisions actually so holding, there 
seems to be quite broad agreement that this is the meaning of Article 
2.2. 
The emergence of this new type of legal standard, which I would 
propose to call "post-discriminatory" -going beyond discrimination-
surely changes the purpose of the scientific inquiry called for by such 
legal standards. One can loosely describe such standards as still being 
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devoted to removing barriers to international trade, in the sense that 
any unnecessary regulation impedes commerce of all kinds, including 
international trade. To the extent that these legal criteria do not re-
quire proof of discrimination, however, they become a rule simply by 
calling for an international tribunal to second-guess the rationality of 
a regulatory judgment at the national level. 
Measures that have this very broad second-guessing purpose are, 
in my view, open to legitimate criticism on several grounds. These are 
reasons that do not fundamentally involve the nature of the scientific 
judgments that the rules call for, objections which you might say are 
prior to the question of the feasibility of the scientific inquiry. One 
can object that such a regulatory purpose of preventing unnecessary 
regulation is simply outside the scope of the jurisdiction or the pur-
pose of the [WfO]. The [WfO] is supposed to be about promoting 
international trade, and this is not part of that original mission or in-
deed its stated mission. 
One can also object that such a rule, which disciplines the ra-
tionality of national regulation even absent a finding of discrimina-
tion, actually gives foreign traders a higher set of legal rights, a 
greater set of legal rights, than is given to the domestic producers with 
whom they compete. To my knowledge, in no legal system are there 
provisions which give rights to object to the rationality of regulations 
which are as broad as those in the WfO Agreement on the Applica-
tion of [SPS] Measures. There are, of course, regulatory laws under 
which scientific judgments are reviewed by courts as a matter of ad-
ministrative law, by reference to a test of whether they comply with the 
standards set by the originating legislation. But the WfO provisions 
on discrimination are much broader than that. So one could object to 
a kind of super-status given to foreign traders that actually would be 
better than the standards given to domestic traders with whom they 
compete. In this sense, I think these provisions are a little like the in-
vestment provisions that you will be hearing about later in the day 
[and which are the subject of Todd Weiler's contribution to the pre-
sent volume]-the investment provisions which also seem to give for-
eign investors more rights against certain kinds of regulations than 
their domestic competitors would have. 
This is not to say that questions of scientific validity, or the ques-
tions we are asking in this conference about the nature of scientific 
inquiry and scientific justification, are irrelevant. I think they add a 
third level of criticism to these kinds of measures. On that level one 
can say, in addition to the previous observations I have mentioned, 
that these measures are not really as objective as they appear. The sci-
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ence under which they qualify is not, cannot be, as objective as one 
might pretend. 
The reason I ask for a careful identification of purpose is that it is 
fairly obvious that it is important to be clear about the nature of ob-
jections one makes to these provisions. Clarity for its own sake is al-
ways good. In this kind of case, in which one has a highly objection-
able provision-and I think they are highly objectionable-it is very 
tempting to let your objections get mixed in with what you are saying 
about the nature of scientific inquiry. If one looks at a provision that 
is thought to be genuinely wrong from the bottom up, it is possible, it 
is tempting, consciously or unconsciously, sometimes to exaggerate 
the particular problems that one has with the application of the sci-
entific criteria to that measure. So my first point, again, is to ask for 
clarity about the purpose of the measure that one is talking about: to 
identify those of the post-discriminatory kind, to be clear about the 
criticisms one is making, and to identify which of the many criticisms 
one can make about them if one is in fact making a particular point. 
Now the other side of the coin, of course, is that we should also 
think carefully about the traditional tests, the anti-discrimination pro-
visions. The place to start is to recognize that the word "discrimina-
tion" that we use in all these cases is a normative term expressing a 
judgment of disapproval. When we see a regulation that has the effect 
of putting foreign goods at a competitive disadvantage, the neutral 
descriptive term for that situation is that the regulation has a "differ-
ential impact." If we think there is nothing wrong with that differen-
tial impact, we continue to call it a differential impact. If we think 
there is something wrong about the differential impact, then we call it 
discrimination. 
The normative judgment that all differential impacts are wrong, 
are discriminatory, usually requires something more in a particular 
situation than the mere fact that a measure or regulation has a differ-
ential impact. The most common additional element to a charge of 
discrimination is the element of purpose or intention, the notion that 
the measure was in tended to harm the disfavored class. GATT and 
\\'TO law may use many other more mechanistic kinds of legal criteria 
and I do not propose to trace all of these in these prefatory remarks. I 
am going to simply suggest that if you scrape off all that surface legal 
doctrine, you will find that most of these criteria, most of the cases, 
are really aimed at establishing whether or not there has been a dis-
criminatory purpose to the measure in question. 
I find it interesting on this question of intention or purpose that 
this particular standard seems to play on both sides of the debate. 
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Whenever I see a paper arguing that a particular measure should not 
be regulated by GATT or WTO, I almost always see that measure de-
scribed by a statement about its intention; it is intended to protect 
human health; it is intended to protect the environment. This is an-
other way of saying that this is a legitimate, good measure that we 
should therefore support. 
There is more to this business of intention than simply the nor-
mative mechanics of how we look at these situations. There is some-
thing of an unstated agreement among governments as to how much 
of this kind of regulation they can really tolerate. A regulation itself 
often entails impacts that are difficult to control. One cannot tell 
when one adopts a regulation whom it is going to affect and how it is 
going to affect them. There are many cases of unintended differential 
impact; this is part of the game, part of the consequences of regula-
tion. Governments looking at this situation have come to the conclu-
sion that they cannot stand the level of intrusion that would occur if 
regulations, all regulations, were subject to prohibition merely based 
on the fact of discriminatory impact, whether accidental or purpose-
ful. So this is an attempt to regulate the intrusiveness of GATT /WTO 
supervision of these issues by saying in effect that one has a justified 
claim to regulators in cases in which they are deliberately discriminat-
ing. This intention test is also kind of a pragmatic standard, which at-
tempts to draw a line delineating how much regulation is too much. 
Now I would like to turn to the application of these discrimina-
tory rules. There are two kinds of WTO cases in which the issue of 
discriminatory purpose comes up. One is a case in which a govern-
ment explicitly, deliberately, adopts a different and less favorable rule 
for foreign products, but in which the government claims it has a 
valid public policy reason for imposing the disadvantage. The issue of 
discriminatory intent turns on the validity of the claim of public pol-
icy purpose. Here, I am happy to accept what Dean Garvey told you a 
few moments ago as a matter of internal U.S. constitutional law under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
The second type of discrimination case is probably the more 
common and also the more difficult case, in which the government 
adopts an ostensibly neutral regulation, such as the avocado regula-
tion that was mentioned by Dean Garvey in his introductory remarks, 
a distinction between products on ostensibly neutral grounds. The 
question is whether that distinction, which places foreign goods at a 
disadvantage, is based on some valid neutral and non-discriminatory 
purpose or whether, alternatively, the purpose is in fact to discrimi-
nate against California avocadoes, for instance. Although there are 
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significant differences between the two types of cases, I am going to 
concentrate today on the first case because I think I can make the 
points I want to make by talking about that kind of case. 
The first category of discrimination cases is illustrated by the 
V\TO's first environmental case-the reformulated gasoline case. The 
regulation was a product standard for gasoline that imposed a sepa-
rate, different, and more rigorous standard for foreign gasoline. The 
U.S. government claimed that the different standard was necessitated 
by the environmental, the clean air goals of the regulation. It said that 
applying the same product standard for domestic gasoline to foreign 
gasoline would not in fact achieve equally clean gasoline because the 
government could not enforce that standard effectively against pro-
ducers located in other countries. This is not a scientific judgment in 
the sense that this word is being used in this conference. That was a 
judgment about regulatory feasibility-the likelihood that the objec-
tives of the regulation could be enforced. The primary issue confront-
ing the V\TO decision-maker was whether the decision was in fact 
made on that basis. The facts of the case at least raised the issue about 
this central question. To be sure, enforcement would have been costly 
in the case of foreign gasoline and there was actually a plausible ar-
gument that it might not work as well. 
But in the other direction, the Environmental Protection 
Agency[ (EPA)] in drafting the regulation had been prepared to apply 
the same product standard to foreign gasoline and it had testified that 
it believed it could enforce that standard effectively against foreign 
suppliers. The U.S. Congress overruled the EPA and ordered the EPA 
not to use the same standard to regulate foreign gasoline. Now at this 
point the question is the following: Was Congress itself making an in-
dependent judgment about the effectiveness of the regulatory ques-
tion involved, or was it engaging in some kind of deliberate protec-
tionism? Further evidence gave some reason to suggest that the 
second might have been its purpose. The issue had been the subject 
of intense lobbying in Congress by the U.S. producers that competed 
with the principal source of foreign gasoline that was at issue here, 
Venezuelan gasoline being sold by, I believe, Citgo in the northeast-
ern United States. Now the explanation suggested by this information 
was that the more rigorous product standard had been adopted sim-
ply to provide trade protection for a local constituent. That was at 
least a plausible possibility. 
Put yourself in the position of the decision-maker dealing with 
this case. Here is a potential case of purposeful discrimination against 
foreign producers. How is the V\TO decision-maker to decide 
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whether or not this regulatory measure is in fact purposeful discrimi-
nation against foreign trade? A common answer at this point is that 
the wro should give deference to national government decisions on 
such regulatory matters, but deference to what? What kind of defer-
ence? Deference to a technical judgment made by the government? 
Deference to a judgment of regulatory policy made by the govern-
ment? Or should the WTO also show deference to a possibly ques-
tionable claim that the regulatory judgment was in fact made? This is 
a claim that every government will make in this case. If the last kind of 
deference is due-in other words, deference to the good faith of the 
government-the concept of deference becomes an ironclad defense. 
There is no way to challenge it. If the WTO decision-maker has to de-
fer to good faith in what the government did, there is no way to get at 
what may be a deliberate trade restriction. 
Note two things about the issue before the WTO decision-maker. 
First, officials who work in this area are convinced that governments 
make deliberately protectionist decisions all the time. They have in-
ternalized the teachings of experience by looking at the hundreds of 
previous cases brought under GATT or WTO rules or under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause in the United States, the cases referred to 
by Dean Garvey, or under Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome, the EU 
equivalent of our Dormant Commerce Clause. This is a collection of 
cases in which one can see hundreds upon hundreds of government 
decisions that discriminate in this fashion. Officials can also cite the 
simple common-sense observation that the political settings for these 
decisions, namely a contest between a local economic interest repre-
sented in the government and a foreign economic interest that is not 
represented in the government, makes protectionist decisions clearly 
the more probable outcome. And finally, they can cite the large regu-
latory institutions that have been constructed in the GATT /WTO, in 
the [United States] in the form of commerce clause litigation, and in 
the EU, to deal with protectionist measures like this one as evidence 
that generations of officials have in fact recognized this possibility and 
felt that it was serious enough to require addressing. Consequently, if 
the rule of decision is to avoid second-guessing the bona fides or good 
faith of government decisions in such a case, then a large amount of 
trade discrimination will go unchecked. 
The second point illustrated by this case is that in most legal set-
tings where tribunals actually do inquire into issues of discriminatory 
purpose like this one, it is a standard canon that tribunals cannot 
judge the actual motivation of the persons who made the decision-
because, in modern governments, we cannot determine who actually 
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made the decision in the first place, and because even ifwe could, we 
do not have the tools to know what motivated the decision of those 
actors, in any event not to any kind of satisfYing degree of certainty. 
The standard way of deciding such purpose questions in GATT 
law, U.S. Constitutional law, and European Community law is by ref-
erence to what I usually refer to as "objective indicators." The objec-
tive indicators, when applied, look a great deal like second-guessing 
the judgments of governments. In general, one looks to whether the 
measure was really necessary to obtain the declared goal. For exam-
ple, one examines whether less restrictive alternatives were available 
and not used, or whether the decision in areas affecting foreign goods 
is in fact consistent with the kinds of decisions that are taken in 
analogous areas which affect sellers of domestic goods. 
In form, a decision that the purpose was discriminatory, but 
which does not actually mention purpose but instead is framed in 
terms of necessity or less restrictive alternatives, comes out looking 
like second-guessing. In the gasoline case, for example, the decision 
came out that the regulatory conclusion was wrong-that, contrary to 
the government's claim of impossibility of regulating equally, in the 
view of the Appellate Body with a little work it would have been possi-
ble to achieve the same result by applying the domestic standard to 
foreign gasoline. 
To be accurate, one should admit that there is more than a kind 
of objective second-guessing that goes on in such decisions. In my ex-
perience decision-makers who are familiar with government policy 
making in this area will usually take account of the entire context of 
the measure as they approach it and will probably come to an early 
opinion, tentative though it may be, about whether the measure 
"smells" discriminatory. The same smell test will be found in the 
community at large. Other government delegations will form an opin-
ion, members of the Secretariat will form an opinion. A good deci-
sion-maker will try to base his or her decision on objective factors. I 
believe it would be dishonest to deny the influence of these intuitive 
judgments. Actually, in this whole business the best informed partici-
pants about government motivation are of course those who are rep-
resenting the defendant government, who, more likely than not, ac-
tually participated in the decision-making process back home. 
Although such representatives will steadfastly defend the measure 
during the litigation, they often provide validation for the smell test 
after it is over. This is one of the ways in which everyone's sense of 
smell begins to sharpen in one case after another. If you have been in 
this business for a while you have not only seen cases that look wrong, 
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but you also have a strong number of confessions telling you that in 
fact they were as wrong as they looked. 
The second-guessing of government regulatory decisions that 
goes on in a trade discrimination case occurs in a much different set-
ting from, and for a much different purpose than, the second-
guessing that seems so unwarranted in the post-discriminatory part of 
the SPS agreement that I discussed earlier in these remarks. First, the 
typical discrimination case concerns a situation in which foreign 
goods are in fact being placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis domestic 
goods. There is a differential impact, the central problem at which 
the international trading system is directed. Second, a discrimination 
case concerns a question of wrongful purpose, not just a mistake in 
judgment. Third, discrimination cases involve a situation in which 
government wrongdoing is a highly possible element-not probable, 
but possible. 
The next point is whether the need to regulate measures with 
discriminatory purposes may not be important enough to justify a 
workable, rather than a perfect, standard of decision-making. Domes-
tic law often decides important questions with a degree of certainty of 
less than one hundred percent. In simple tort and contract suits, for 
example, courts decide which of two conflicting versions of the facts 
has occurred by asking which of the two versions is simply the more 
probable, even though we know that there is no way to know for cer-
tain what the truth is. In criminal cases we allow courts and juries to 
decide whether criminal defendants had certain states of mind. Al-
though the standard of proof applied in those cases is the much 
higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" test, we know that we cannot 
really know for certain what state of mind the defendant had. vVe de-
cide these issues nonetheless because the alternative of not deciding 
them is chaos. 
Now the other question is this. In the gasoline case, how certain 
must a panel be that the same standard can be applied effectively to 
foreign gasoline before it can properly issue a decision saying that? 
Would it be good enough if [the panel was] convinced that the quality 
of foreign gasoline would be almost as good? What does this long ex-
position of the gasoline case have to do with the questions about sci-
ence raised in this conference? Very briefly, it is my way of asking 
whether the questions being asked about science are the right ones, 
or, rather, whether the very good questions that are asked do not 
need to be supplemented by some other quite relevant questions. 
The questions we are asking today are introduced by saying that 
the SPS provisions are based on a premise that the scientific corrunu-
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nity, that the scientific issues that they pose, can be answered fully and 
in a completely objective manner. To the extent that is true, and to 
the extent that is the purpose of these scientific criteria, it is certainly 
highly relevant to demonstrate the ways in which science cannot per-
form the tasks assigned. I am trying to show that the WTO has many 
other provisions in which imperfect, best-that-we-can-do answers may 
be good enough, because a demand for perfection will block all regu-
latory activity. 
If one thinks about what science can contribute to the operation 
of such legal provisions, one has to start adding some other questions. 
For example, instead of asking whether science can contribute an ob-
jective answer to the question whether the measure is based on sound 
science, should we also not be asking whether science can provide any 
relevant e\idence on the question whether the purpose of that par-
ticular measure is protectionist? Or, to ask almost the same thing, 
whether science can provide any relevant evidence on the question 
whether a particular measure has any other credible regulatory pur-
pose other than that of protectionism? 
Thank you very much, and I look forward to hearing the 
thoughts of others on these important issues. 
